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To the surprise of many observers, the Scottish government announced in early 2015 
plans for a Scottish National ID system, based on the existing health service database. 
The Scottish National Party (SNP), in power in Scotland since 2007, had previously 
strongly rejected similar plans for a national database for the whole of the UK due to 
privacy concerns. How can this change of policy be explained? This paper puts the 
discussion in a much wider historical context, tracing it back to the 2014 independence 
referendum and ultimately the “asymmetric constitution” of the UK that followed the 
Union of Parliaments in 1707. Asymmetric constitutions pose unique challenges for some 
aspects of data protection law, where age-old questions of political and cultural identity 
and the more technocratic project of an “e-identity” are ultimately inextricably intertwined. 
Also, much of it will turn out to be the fault of the Germans. 
1 “Ye Hypocrites, are these your pranks” 
In 2007, the Scottish National Party (SNP) won for the first time a 
majority in a Scottish parliamentary election. At that time, a La-
bour government in London was pursuing a national ID card 
project for the whole of the UK. The backbone of this scheme was 
going to be a centralised computer database, the National Identity 
Register (NIR).1 Biometric information in the form of fingerprint 
scans was to be linked to the register. The physical embodiment 
envisaged three types of identity cards: 
! The National Identity Card, lilac and salmon in colour, for 
British citizens only.  
! The Identification Card, turquoise and green in colour for EU 
citizens living in the UK  
! The Identity Card for Foreign Nationals, blue and pink for 
immigrants from non-EU/EEA countries  
Refusal to register was to carry a fine, as was failure to alert the 
authorities that a card had been lost, or that details in the register 
had changed.  
In 2009, the Scottish Government confirmed Scotland's opposi-
tion to ID cards in a letter from Minister for Community Safety 
Fergus Ewing to the UK Government: 
"The Scottish Government continues to be completely opposed 
to the National Identity Scheme, and the Scottish Parliament 
recently supported a call for the UK Government to cancel its 
plans for the National Identity Scheme. […] There is little tangible 
evidence to suggest ID cards will deliver any of the benefits 
Westminster claim: it is far from certain they will do anything to 
safeguard against crime and terrorism, and there are real concerns 
                                                             
1 For a more detailed account see Beynon-Davies, Paul. The UK national identi-
ty card. Journal of Information Technology Teaching Cases 1, no. 1, 2011, pp. 12-
21. 
that the cards and the identity database could increase the risk of 
fraud, not reduce it.”2 
Opposition against this card scheme was widespread, and after 
Labour lost the 2010 national election, it was scrapped by the 
Conservative-LibDem coalition. 
In December 2014, the Scottish SNP-led government, re-
elected with a much increased majority in the 2011 Scottish elec-
tions, published a “minor” consultation on the “proposed amend-
ments to the National Health Service Central Register (Scotland) 
Regulations 2006”. The proposal, if implemented, will transform 
the Scottish National Health Service Central Register (NHSCR) 
into a full-scale population register accessible to over 120 organi-
sations. It will create a unique and persistent identifier that facili-
tates data sharing across agencies, while at the same time increas-
ing the reach of the database and also the type of information that 
it contains. According to several commentators, it will create what 
the SNP in Scotland and Westminster had opposed in 2009: a 
National ID database.3 Importantly, the Information Commission-
er’s Office warned that the proposal, which lacks a Privacy Impact 
Assessment, risked breaching data protection laws and privacy 
standards. It also echoed the concern that the “creeping use of 
such identifiers” would eventually lead to a national ID card, 
introduced in circumvention of the democratic process:  
“If we are to have a national identity number this should be the 
subject of proper debate and be accompanied by suitable safe-
guards. It should not just happen by default.”4  
The proposed changes in a nutshell:  
At present, only the National Health Service (NHS) and some 
local authorities can access the NHSCR for the purpose of identi-
fying citizens. In the future, it will provide services to 120 organi-
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sations, including police, prisons, universities and some publicly 
owned companies such as Glasgow Airport, Quality Meat Scot-
land and Scottish Canals, VisitScotland and the Bòrd na Gàidhlig.  
At present, only around 30% of citizens have their addresses on 
the NHSCR. The aim is to increase this to 100%, partly by data 
sharing and matching between the register and its new users, 
partly by merging it with the Community Health Index Postcode 
(CHIP). At present, postcode data is only provided consensually, 
under the new system, this consensual model would shift towards 
mandatory registration. 
The proposal states three general aims for the proposal: 
1) to increase data quality  
This would be at the expense of the consensus model which is a 
main reason for poor or incomplete data. 
2) to extend the ability to access online services using Myac-
count to a wider range of public services 
The new extended system will act as e-identity provider for 
Myaccount, the online system for the delivery of public service in 
Scotland. National Records of Scotland, as administrators of the 
NHSCR will acquire a critical role as an identity provider.  
3) to assist with the tracing of certain persons  
Explicitly named are children at risk (e.g. children missing 
within the education system) and foreign individuals with out-
standing debts with the NHS. No more specifics are given – one 
of the key complaints by the Information Commissioner’s Office, 
since some of these functions are already covered elsewhere, and 
without further specification could result in tracing citizens who 
for good and legal reasons do not want to be found  
Finally: 
4) to enable the identification of Scottish tax payers to ensure 
the accurate allocation of tax receipts associated with the Scottish 
Rate of Income Tax to Scotland 
To understand exactly what these changes to the NHSCR 
amount to and if the charge of hypocrisy is merited, we need first 
to understand what the NHSCR is – and for this, a historical anal-
ysis of the origins of the database and the discussion surrounding 
it will be needed. 
2 “See the front o' battle lour!” 
The NHSCR is an electronic database held and maintained by the 
National Records Office (NRO). It contains basic demographic 
details of everyone born or deceased in Scotland, or who was at 
some point registered with a General Medical Practitioner (GP) 
here. In modern times, its primary purpose is to facilitate the 
movement of medical patient records between Health Boards both 
within Scotland, and between Scotland and the rest of the UK. Its 
earlier history though gives us a rich case study in the problems of 
national ID systems.  
The NHSCR grew out of a census held in the UK in 1939 as 
part of the effort to put the UK on war footing. An example of 
wartime emergency legislation, the National Registration Act 
1939 paved the way to a national census (or “enumeration” as it 
was called in law). As part of the census, every person received a 
unique “civil registration number” (based on their address on 
enumeration night, and later on the birth register). This prepared 
the ground for issuing the National Identity Card, issuing food 
ration books, and identifying eligible adults for conscription.5 It 
                                                             
5 See http://www.nrscotland.gov.uk/statistics-and-data/nhs-central-
register/about-the-register/the-history-of-the-register for an authoritative “participant 
also was used to identify children for evacuation purposes, which 
made the address an essential part of the information. Other data 
collected were names, gender, age, occupation, marital status and 
membership in the armed forces. 
Most of these purposes became obsolete after the war had end-
ed, though rationing continued for a few years. Introduced as 
emergency legislation with a sunset clause, the law that had ena-
bled the census nonetheless proved remarkably difficult to get rid 
of. In 1946, Parliament passed the first of what would become a 
series of “Emergency Laws (Transitional Provisions) Acts”, 
which perpetuated several wartime laws, before becoming ulti-
mately repealed in the 1956 Emergency Laws (Repeal) Act. The 
universally unpopular ID card system did not survive quite as 
long. It had been a controversial piece of legislation even under 
the tense conditions of 1939. The speeches of two Members of 
Parliament (MPs) at the time are particularly insightful. The La-
bour MP for the constituency of Farnworth, Georg Tomlinson, 
who had been elected in a by election just the previous year, said: 
"It may be that there is a necessity for compiling a register, but 
here you have the possibility of people being stopped and asked 
whether they have or have not lost their cards. You may challenge 
a dozen people and you find one who has committed an offence. It 
will not help a scrap to win the war, but there is the possibility of 
penalising somebody who is perfectly innocent because we have 
passed a law for another purpose entirely"6 
Here we find two ideas that had a lasting impact. First, Tomlin-
son anticipated what would later become, under Data Protection 
law, the purpose specification principle, but also anticipating that 
once data was collected, “mission creep” was all but inevitable. 
Second, we find a separation between the legal requirement to 
carry a physical Identity Card and the database that underpins 
such a card. It is only the former, not the latter that is seen prob-
lematic. This attitude would remain a defining feature of public 
debate on identity cards and identity registers up to the present 
day. Back in 1939, John Tinker MP expressed the concerns thus:  
"We do not want to be stopped in the street by any person any-
where and to be forced to produce a card. If that kind of thing 
begins, we shall be afraid of people meeting us and asking for our 
cards. One thing that we do respect in this country is our freedom 
from being challenged on every occasion to produce something to 
prove that we are certain persons"7  
The requirement to carry a physical ID card became subject of a 
criminal trial in 1950, when Clarence Henry Willcock became the 
last person in the UK to be prosecuted under the wartime act. He 
had been challenged by a police constable of the name Harold 
Muckle to present his identity card at a police station within 48 
hours. Willcock refused as a matter of principle, saying: "I am a 
Liberal and I am against this sort of thing". During his subsequent 
trial, he argued that as the stated purpose of ID cards had lapsed 
with the end of the war, citizens were under no obligation to pro-
duce them. This was to no avail, and he was convicted and 
charged the pricely sum of 10 shillings, approximately £ 11 in 
today’s money.  
In Willcock v Muckle [1951] 2 ALL ER 367, the Court of Ap-
peal upheld the conviction, but Lord Goddard, the then Lord Chief 
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Justice of England and Wales, showed strong sympathy for the 
defence: 
"This Act was passed for security purposes, and not for the pur-
poses for which, apparently, it is now sought to be used. To use 
Acts of Parliament, passed for particular purposes during war, in 
times when the war is past, except that technically a state of war 
exists, tends to turn law-abiding subjects into lawbreakers, which 
is a most undesirable state of affairs." 
Here too we find the fear of mission creep, but also again the 
focus on police powers and their right to demand identification 
from citizens.8 We also note in passing that despite strong objec-
tions, the courts were unable to invalidate the law. This too is a 
feature of the UK constitutional settlement, with a strong empha-
sis on parliamentary sovereignty and a correspondingly weak(er) 
control by the courts which can not normally invalidate primary 
legislation.  
When the Labour Government of Attlee was defeated in the 
general election of 1951, the new Conservative government under 
Winston Churchill abolished the law in 1952, to great support 
from the general public but against the expressed wishes of police 
and security services. Ever since, political opposition to ID cards 
in the UK tends to emphasise that the very concept is an alien, 
foreign idea, something typical for the French or German “admin-
istrative” state, and thus not “properly British”.9 Not having a 
British Identity card thus became part of British identity.  
3 “Be blest with health, and peace, and 
sweet content!” 
While 1951 saw the end of national ID cards, the database or 
register that underpinned them stayed in existence. Governments 
rarely give up information about citizens once collected, and soon 
a new use for the census data emerged.  
From the 19th century onwards, the state had taken on a more 
and more active role in providing public health care throughout 
Europe. During the interwar years, it had become clear however 
that the UK was significantly lagging behind continental Europe 
and the US, as measured in international league tables. William 
Alexander Robson, one of the most influential academic commen-
tators during that time, decried the “multiplication of health au-
thorities and the disintegration of function”, and was in particular 
concerned about the “failure to envisage the health of the commu-
nity at different ages and different stages”.10 In 1942, this insight 
became one of the three core principles of what was to become the 
National Health Service, when Beveridge's famous report on 
“Social Insurance and Allied Services” envisioned a welfare state 
that provided “from cradle to grave”.11 Of course, any hope to 
address Robson’s concern would be facilitated, in due time, by 
having a single identifier for health service providers that allows 
to track individuals through their ages and stages in life.  
                                                             
8 See also Joinson, A. N., Paine, C., Buchanan, T., and Reips, U. Watching me, 
watching you: privacy attitudes and reactions to identity card implementation 
scenarios in the United Kingdom. Journal of Information Science, 2006, vol. 32(4), 
pp. 334-343. 
9 Agar, Jon. Modern horrors: British identity and identity cards. In: Caplan, Jane, 
Torpey, John (eds.). Documenting individual identity: the development of state 
practices in the modern world 1, 2001, pp. 101-120, p. 102. 
10 Robson, William Alexander. The development of local government. Allen & 
Unwin, 1937, p. 333. 
11 Abel-­‐‑Smith, Brian. The Beveridge report: Its origins and outcomes. Internatio-
nal Social Security Review, 1992, 45#1-­‐‑2 pp. 5-1. 
Keeping track of an individual over time was only one of the 
requirements that were to come with a National Health Service. 
As important was the need to track individuals through space. 
Health provisions in both England and Scotland at the time were 
blighted by a chaotic and highly fragmented system of service 
provision and governance. A particular problem was the co-
existence of a private and a public hospital system, which, in the 
words of Bertrand Dawson, author of the influential Dawson 
report in 1920, resulted in “duplicating and even conflicting, 
without machinery in existence for coordinating their activities".12 
In South Wales alone, 93 public hospitals were "governed" by 46 
local authorities. Thrown into the mix were a further 48 voluntary 
hospitals that operated totally independently of each other and any 
state control. 13  Local resistance of these independent bodies 
against any form of more streamlined administration was fierce, 
and, supported by the medical associations, successful in prevent-
ing any reform in the interwar years. This chaotic state of affair 
was however unable to cope with the demands the war made on 
Britain, especially once civilian causalities were mounting as the 
result of the air raids. An Emergency Medical Service was put in 
place, centrally controlled and with significant new infrastructure 
investment. As contemporary observers noted: "the bombing 
plane, by transforming the nature of warfare, has forced on us a 
transformation of our medical services”. Or as Charles Webster 
put it more acerbically in modern days: “The Luftwaffe achieved 
in months what had defeated politicians and planners for at least 
two decades”.14 
In 1941, the Government announced a proposal for a compre-
hensive hospital service, which however had a significant degree 
of “localism”, putting local authorities in charge of providing it. 
The Beveridge Report of December 1942 recommended in 1942 a 
National Health Service with general practitioners who would 
work though regional health centres and hospitals. A 1944 “White 
Paper” finally included the founding principles of the NHS as a 
nationalised health provider: 
! All services are to be provided free at the point of use and fi-
nanced through general taxation. 
! Everyone, independent of income, nationality, or age is eligible 
for care. 
The last point is of particular importance for our discussion. It 
meant that questions of (national) identity were less relevant for 
the new system than one might have thought. It had from its in-
ception a duty to also provide services for foreigners temporarily 
visiting the UK (undoubtedly also necessitated by the large scale 
displacement of people during the war), who were not taxpayers 
and hence also not part of a prior registration or identification 
system. 
When after the war Clement Attlee's Labour Party government 
tasked Aneurin Bevan with implementing these ideas, he decided 
that "the only thing to do was to create an entirely new hospital 
service, to take over the voluntary hospitals, and to take over the 
local government hospitals and to organise them as a single hospi-
tal service". The result however still showed that it was based on a 
compromise between groups favouring a highly decentralised and 
regionalised approach, and those favouring a stronger role for a 
centralised administration. One consequence of this compromise 
was to keep the health systems of Scotland and England separate 
                                                             
12 Speeches by Lord Dawson of Penn, The Times, 19 Oct 1937. 
13 Webster, Charles. The national health service: A political history. Oxford Uni-
versity Press, 2002, p. 5. 
14 Webster, 2002, p. 6. 
entities, with entirely different lines of command and responsibil-
ity, and different funding streams. The NHS in England and 
Wales was established by the National Health Service Act 1946, 
which received Royal Assent on 6 November 1946. NHS Scot-
land was created by the National Health Service (Scotland) Act 
1947.  
The balance between centralism and regionalism was achieved 
by a “tripartite” system: Firstly, the hospital sector became nation-
alised, with (in England) 14 Regional Hospital Boards with over-
all responsibility to coordinate health services, and below them 
400 Hospital Management Committees responsible for the admin-
istration of hospitals.  
Secondly, local authorities took on many of the roles the old 
“Poor laws” had assigned to parish councils, including vaccination 
programs, health education and midwife services.  
Thirdly, the main responsibility for primary care was to lie with 
general practitioners (GP) who remained semi-independent, paid 
for each person on their list. As points of first contact, they also 
created the health records of their patients. Because payment was 
by number of people recorded on their lists, creation of adminis-
trative records that identified individual patients became part and 
parcel of their role. Since, as we discussed above, people are 
entitled to NHS treatment independent of their nationality or place 
of residence, these patient registers included people who would 
not be part of any other governmental register or data set.  
This set-up immediately created an obvious problem. As an in-
creasingly mobile workforce moved between Health Boards, or 
indeed between Scotland and England, they would end up on 
several lists, one for each GP whose services they used. This 
proliferation of lists made reliable payment to GPs impossible, 
and also made it difficult to ensure that the current GP got access 
to the health records of his patients. A method needed to be found 
to track an individual across different care providers – and the 
census data provided just that information. As it had recorded 
people irrespectively of their nationality or employment status, it 
matched the requirement of a health service free for everybody. 
Because it was the result of a central effort, it avoided duplication 
of IDs. So while the national ID cards were discarded, the census 
data that underpinned them found a new use as a central enabler of 
the modern welfare state and formed the core of the National 
Health Service Central Register. 
4 “Then gently scan your brother man” 
Maintaining the NHSCR became one of the functions of the Gen-
eral Register Office for Scotland (GROS), already charged since 
1854 with recording all births and deaths in Scotland. With that 
data, the aim of the modern welfare state and the NHS in particu-
lar, to provide services from cradle to grave, could be supported 
administratively. In 2011, GROS and the National Archives of 
Scotland (NAS) merged to form the National Records of Scotland 
(NRS), which is the body now charged with maintaining the 
NHSCR.  
Crucially, the NHSCR does not contain patient’s health records 
(with the exception of certain types of cancer patients for research 
purposes). It enables however the location of a health record 
wherever it is held. At this point, we can see why the Scottish SNP 
can argue that its proposal is nothing like the UK database it had 
rejected in 2009: NHSCR is not (just) a national database, rather, 
it is a register of all customers of the NHS, domestic and foreign. 
It is also not linked to a physical card, let alone one mandatory to 
carry – the main focus of opposition to national ID systems in the 
UK as we have seen. 
However, while the NHS was the historical corner stone of the 
modern welfare state in the UK, it provides of course only one 
important element of it. A whole range of services and benefits are 
provided today, many administered locally and facing similar 
problems as those experienced by the young NHS. In Scotland for 
instance, pensioners are entitled to free bus passes. But since many 
bus companies are run by local councils, a way had to be found to 
identify pensioners and their entitlement across municipal bounda-
ries.  
It is therefore maybe surprising that it took until 2004 before 
politicians realised that the NHSCR could also support these types 
of “public service delivery”. That year, NRS was asked to provide 
the unique reference number created for NHS customers also to 
the equivalent index of customers of Scottish local authorities. To 
pre-empt concerns, only data of people who had specifically asked 
to be included in the local authority database were added. This 
new and widened remit of NHSCR soon became linked to the 
National Entitlement Card – a multi-application smartcard that 
according to the local councils that promote it  is  
! quick to use – just flash it over a reader and it scans automati-
cally; 
! convenient – a single card with many uses helping you to re-
duce the number of cards you need to carry.15 
Depending on the local council, the card can be used e.g. as li-
brary card, for cashless catering within schools, taxi travel for 
disabled people, or as proof of age for pupils. 
Here we can see why the critics of the new scheme claim it is an 
ID system in all but name: by combining a mandatory but card-
free registration system whose purpose was initially national 
defence and that became central for national health, with a carded 
but not mandatory system, the resulting database does create a de 
facto mandatory, universal and nation-wide ID and ID card sys-
tem.  
 An additional layer of complexity was added when the Scottish 
government introduced as part of its “Digital Future agenda” the 
“Myaccount” facility, soft-launched in Edinburgh in 2014. Myac-
count is the digital equivalent to the Entitlement Card – a single 
online account that allows registered users to access government 
services. Participation is (so far) voluntary and all services remain 
available offline. As more and more government services are 
moved online, not just in Scotland but throughout the Western 
world, this is not an unusual development. An e-identity is a nec-
essary precondition for such a system, and both on the level of the 
UK (and by implication England) and on the Scottish level, steps 
are taken to create one. However, the ways how such an e-identity 
should work differ in interesting ways. For the UK, the Cabinet 
Office in London envisions a federated system where private 
sector providers will become accredited e-identity providers. In 
Scotland, this role will be taken on by the government through 
NHSCR. This is not just a minor technical detail, it reflects a deep 
and systematic difference in political culture between these two 
constituent parts of the UK, and is an explicit policy decision: 
“The Scottish Government considers that the people of Scotland 
will prefer a public sector, not-for-profit body to be responsible for 
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“Myaccount”. This contrasts with the UK Government’s approach 
of individuals setting up an account with a private sector body.”16  
In the international discussion on privacy, the US approach with 
its trust in companies is often contrasted with the European trust in 
governments. Within the microcosmos of the UK, we find the 
same juxtaposition. Post-war Scotland tended to return govern-
ments that were to the left of the UK-wide majority, England, 
especially southern England, favoured more conservative policies. 
Support for the public sector in Scotland remains very strong; 
privatisation is driven by policies formulated in England.  
By accentuating the role of the government to certify and pro-
tect e-identities, the Scottish approach aligns therefore at first sight 
well with the overall political landscape and a narrative of Scottish 
exceptionalism, which defines itself systematically also “against” 
the politics of London and the City.  
5 “What's done we partly may compute” 
Thus viewed in its historical context, the latest proposals to further 
extend the coverage of the NHSCR can be seen as a logical exten-
sion of post-war Scottish (identity) politics: Where the 2009 pro-
posal for the UK ID card had emphasised fear of crime, illegal 
immigration and the social problem of benefit cheats, the Scottish 
approach accentuates the positive role of the welfare state and the 
need of service delivery to the infirm. It follows the trajectory of 
the 1939 census described above and is unlike its abandoned UK 
predecessor essentially inclusive. It is not based on nationality but 
either residency or mere use of services. Unlike the UK ID pro-
posal, no criminal sanctions are proposed – yet – for not carrying a 
correct ID, nor is the NHSCR database linked – yet – to biometric 
identifiers the way the 2009 proposal was.  
However, this socially inclusive narrative hides the significant 
privacy concerns that the 2014 approach shares with the aban-
doned 2009 proposal. It also ignores that the question of central-
ised and persistent identifiers, as opposed to federated and tem-
poral solutions, is orthogonal to the public sector - private sector 
dichotomy.17 This means that more privacy-friendly solutions that 
preserve the structural advantages of a federated “trusted third 
parties” model favoured by the UK Cabinet Office seem highly 
feasible, even with public sector governance.  
Evaluated from this perspective, the concerns about the ID con-
sultation are not (just) what the new enhanced system will disclose 
about citizens. Rather, it is the lack of detail about intended appli-
cation, the lack of any recognition that while the extended data-
base will not be a national ID system, it can easily be extended to 
become one, and given this, the choice of implementation and lack 
of parliamentary scrutiny. As the Information Commissioner in 
his response pointed out, not only is a Privacy Impact Assessment 
missing, the description of the intended applications remains so ill 
defined that a proper proportionality assessment will be difficult to 
carry out. 
So how should we judge the proposal? Should we judge its pro-
ponents gently, the way Robert Burns, Scotland’s national poet 
urged us to judge each other in general, for “What's done we 
partly may compute/ But know not what's resisted”? Or should we 
                                                             
16 http://blogs.scotland.gov.uk/digital/2014/04/07/myaccount-signing-in-to-on-
line-services/ 
17 The author has to declare an interest at this point. I was consultant in a Cabi-
net Office study on e-identity for the UK, and also worked on a separate project 
with Police Scotland on a federated trusted third party approach that while in public 
service ownership, intentionally avoided a single persistent identifier system.  
consider it as a disingenuous power grab by an administration and 
remember Burn’s words that “Some books are lies frae end to 
end”, and the government is often dominated by “chaps wha in a 
barn or byre Wad better fill'd their station”? The answer attempted 
here tries to find a third way. While the proposal raises serious 
concerns for privacy and also for the democratic process, these are 
not best understood as merely a cynical ploy. Rather, they are the 
result of long-term dynamics of UK political history. Some of 
these we encountered in the historical background narrative of the 
NHSCR. It left the UK with an “asymmetric” constitution, where 
each constituent part (England, Wales, Scotland and Northern 
Ireland) has different degrees of autonomy and responsibility, 
Underlying these are informal and contingent ways to understand 
and conceptualise what “national identity” means, a process where 
regional identities (Scottish, Irish, English) and federal (British) 
identity remain in constant flux and are constantly renegotiated. 
This creates inevitable tensions when the law is asked to “fixate” 
these identities through regulation.  
This becomes particularly clear if we look at the fourth of the 
intended uses of the new system, to identify taxpayers liable to the 
new “Scottish” income tax. It is this new power of the Scottish 
executive, won in a complex political process, that ultimately 
forces the hand of the administration, or so we’ll argue. To under-
stand this context, we once again have to look back in history. 
  
 
On the 18th September 2014, Scotland voted with a 45-55 ma-
jority to remain in the UK. However, during a hard-fought cam-
paign, where polls at one point had indicated a majority for exit, 
the Westminster government had already indicated a willingness 
to far-reaching concessions in the case of a No vote, and in partic-
ular substantially increased powers to vary income tax. These new 
powers are likely to come into law in 2015, and unlike its precur-
sor powers, which were so limited to be harmful rather than a real 
option, the Scottish government is likely to make use of them. 
This however requires an infrastructure that allows the tax authori-
ties to distinguish between Scots and non-Scots. This infrastruc-
ture however is not in place – the UK tax regime had no need to 
differentiate along the geographic boundaries of the nations that 
constitute the UK. The rate for UK income tax was uniform across 
the Kingdom, and since the Welsh and Northern Irish Assemblies 
do not have tax raising powers, and the English no separate par-
liament at all, there was also no need to co-ordinate centrally 
between separate regional income tax regimes.  
In this asymmetric environment, no existing register or database 
matches exactly what the new tax rising regime in Edinburgh 
would demand – and for understandable historical reasons, as this 
would require the very debate which as we have seen was almost 
intentionally avoided through the centuries – what it means to 
have both a British and a regional-national identity. Rather, the 
relation of each kingdom within the UK with the central govern-
ment grew ad-hoc, where shifting power balances created a 
unique set of rights and rules for each of them, with no centralised 
mechanism to resolve the resulting tensions.  
In this power vacuum, administrative bodies and decision-
makers can often operate outside the public gaze, and nowhere 
more so than when decisions can be framed as abstract questions 
of ICT technology. Many years ago, in my report on the state of e-
governance in the UK for the International Congress on Compara-
tive law, I described how in the informal practices of UK admin-
istration (which relies much more on conventions and “under-
standings” than the comparatively legalistic and juridified system 
of continental Europe), government departments had been able to 
commandeer the e-governance agenda to push decisions that 
ought to have been subject to public debate and accountability into 
technological questions to be answered by software developers  – 
after appropriate instruction by senior civil servants.18 A much 
more daring argument along similar lines had been suggested by 
Jon Agar in The Government Machine19, where he argued that the 
introduction of computers to control state action was indeed close 
to a revolution in the technical sense of “overthrowing the gov-
ernment”, led by civil servants and resulting in a new form of 
technocracy.   
Of the rationales given for the extended new database, its use 
for tax administration is the most unexpected – previous attempts 
to create a national ID database in the UK had presented this either 
as “crime and terrorism prevention” or “entitlement cards”. In the 
analysis here, it is however the most important element, and we 
suspect the main driver behind the project. The referenda of 1996 
and 2014 created a constitutional reality whose ramifications for 
everyday practice had never been properly planned. In such a 
situation, re-using what is available and bootstrapping on existing 
systems is a logical response. The critics of the proposed system 
are both right and wrong: yes, it has privacy implications that give 
rise to reasonable concerns, but not because of an attempt to intro-
duce surveillance through the backdoor, but because it is an ad-
hoc and unplanned response to needs created by the devolution 
referenda. The Information Commissioner is right in saying that 
ideally, such an important decision should come through parlia-
ment, and after proper political debate, but his analysis also under-
estimates what is at stake. The issue, ultimately, is not just if as a 
society we should have a system like the NHSCR, it is much more 
momentous than that – a national database needs to answer what it 
means to be part of that nation.  
That question had played out in the cultural and political arena 
ever since the union in 1707 and was the ever present undercur-
rent in the referenda debates, but never crystallised into legal 
form. In 1996, the UK government had intentionally framed the 
discussion so as to avoid an open debate on Scottish identity when 
it opened up the franchise to all and only residents. In 2014, the 
SNP campaigned on an equally inclusive concept of citizenship, 
but its plans to translate this into a legal concept were rendered 
moot when the electorate rejected independence. This also pre-
vented the creation of a national constitutional convention, and an 
open public debate about a rational form of constitutional ar-
rangement for the UK. In this political and legal vacuum, the 
choice of the NHSCR as a de facto national database could be 
described as inspired. The inclusive concept of membership inher-
ited from its foundation as part of the modern welfare state and the 
NHS aligns it well with the inclusive understanding of the fran-
chise that informed not just the 20th century referenda, but is much 
older and deeper ingrained. Linking the use case for a national 
database to the question of taxation answers the question “who is 
Scottish” in a peculiar yet time honoured way: not by race, creed, 
or the accident of birth, but by the very material contribution to the 
collective good that one is willing to make.   
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